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Abstract: When a knowledge base represents the experts' uncertainty, then it is reasonable
to ask how far we are from the complete knowledge, that is, how many more questions do
we have to ask (to these experts, to nature by means of experimenting, etc) in order to
attain the complete knowledge. Of course, since we do not know what the real world is, we
cannot get the precise number of questions from the very beginning: it is quite possible,
for example, that we ask the right question first and thus guess the real state of the world
after the first question. So we have to estimate this number and use this estimate as a
natural measure of completeness for a given knowledge base.
We give such estimates for Dempster-Shafer formalism. Namely, we show that this
average number of questions can be obtained by solving a simple mathematical optimiza-
tion problem. In principle this characteristic is not always sut_cient to express the fact
,- that sometimes we have more knowledge. For example, it has the same value if we have an
O,
,._ event with two possible outcomes and nothing else is known, and if there is an additional
knowledge that the probability of every outcome is 0.5. We'll show that from the practical
0_¢u viewpoint this is not a problem, because the difference between the necessary number of
questions in both cases is practically negligible.
Keywords: complexity of knowledge acquisition, Dempster-Shafer formalism.
1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM.
Knowledge is usually not complete. The vast majority of modern knowledge bases
include uncertain knowledge, that is, statements about which the experts themselves are
not 100% sure that they are absolutely true. This uncertainty leads to uncertainty in
the answers to the queries: instead of yes-no answers, we get answers like "probably" and
"with probability 0.8". Sometimes the uncertainty is too high, and we cannot get anything
definite from the resulting expert system. When a knowledge base represents the experts'
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uncertainty, then it is reasonableto askhow far we are from the complete knowledge, that
is, i_owmany more questions do we have to ask (to theseexperts, to nature by meansof
experimenting, etc) in order to attain the complete knowledge. Of course, sincewe do not
know what the real world is, we cannot get the precise number of questions from the very
beginning: it is quite possible, e.g., that we ask the right question first and thus guess the
reM state of the world after the first question. So we can only get estimates for the number
of necessary questions. These estimates are a natural measure of completeness for a given
knowledge base.
Estimates of incompleteness are useful. Such estimates can be useful in several cases.
For example, suppose that we feel like our knowledge base needs updating and we want to
estimate the cost of the update. The main part of updating is the acquisition of the new
knowledge from the experts. Since it is desirable to take the best (and therefore highly
paid) specialists as experts, the knowledge acquisition cost is an essential part of the total
update cost. From our previous experience, we can get the expected per question cost c
by dividing the previous update cost by the number of questions asked. To estimate the
total acquisition cost, we multiply c by the number of necessary questions.
Another situation where these estimates are applicable is when we choose between
the existing knowledge bases (for example, when we decide which of them to buy). When
choosing we must take into consideration cost, performance time, etc. But the main
characteristic of the knowledge base is how much information it contains. It is difficult to
estimate this amount of information directly, but we can use the estimates of the number
of questions if they are available: Evidently the fewer questions we need to ask in order to
obtain the complete knowledge, the more information was there initially. So the knowledge
base, for which we have to ask the minimal number of questions, is the one with the greatest
amount of information.
What we are planning to do. There exist several different formalisms for representing
uncertainty (see, e.g., Smets et al, 1988). In the present paper we estimate the neces-
sary number of questions for the case of Dempster-Shafer formalism. Namely, we show
that this average number of questions can be obtained by solving a simple mathematical
optimization problem.
It turns out that the same techniques can be applied to estimate the complexity of
knowledge acquisition for the probabilistic approach to uncertainty (Nilsson, 1986).
It seems desirable to have such a characteristic of uncertainty that if we add addi-
tional information (i.e., diminish uncertainty), we decrease the value of this characteristic.
Strictly speaking, our characteristic (averagenumber of binary question) do not satisfy
this property. For example, it has the samevalue if we have an event with two possible
outcomes and nothing elseis known, and if there is an additional knowledge that the prob-
ability of every outcome is 0.5. We'll show that from the practical viewpoint this is not a
problem, becausethe difference between the necessarynumber of questions in both cases
is practically negligible.
The main results of this paper appearedfirst in (Chokr et al, 1991).
The structure of the paper is as follows: there exists a well-known case, where a formula
for the average number of questions is known: the case of probabilistic knowledge, that
was considered in the pioneer Shannon papers on information theory. We are planning to
use the same methods that were used in its derivation. Since the derivation is not as well
known as Shannon's formula itself, we'll briefly describe it in Section 2. In Section 3, we'll
formulate a corresponding problem for Dempster-Shafer formalism in mathematical terms
and present our results. In Section 4, we'll show that this characteristic is sometimes not
sufficient, but from practical viewpoint there is no need to worry. In Section 5 we apply
the same techniques to the case of a probabilistic knowledge. Proofs are in Section 6.
2. SHANNON'S FORMULA REVISITED
First let's analyze the simplest possible case: formulation. Before we actually
analyze Shannon's formula, let us recall how to compute the complexity of knowledge
acquisition in the simplest case: Namely, we consider one event, and we know beforehand
that it can result in one of finitely many incompatible outcomes. Let's denote these
outcomes by A1, A2,..., and their total number by n. For example, in the coin tossing case
n equals two, and A1 and A_ are "heads" and "tails". If we are describing weather, then
it is natural to take "raining" as A1, "snowing" as A2, etc. How many binary questions
do we have to ask in order to find out which of the outcomes occurred?
The simplest case: result. The answer is well known: we must ask Q questions, where
Q is the smallest integer that is greater than or equal to log 2 n. This number is sometimes
called the ceiling of log 2 n and is denoted by [log2 n]. And if we ask less than Q questions,
we will be unable to always find the outcome.
Although the proof of this fact is well-known (see, e.g., Horowitz and Sahni, 1984),
we repeat it here, because this result will be used as a basis for all other estimates.
The simplest case: proof. First we have to prove that Q questions are sufficient.
Indeed, let's enumerate all the outcomes (in arbitrary order) by numbers from 0 to n - 1,
and write these numbers in the binary form. Using binary numbers with q digits, one gets
numbers from 0 to 2q - 1, that is, totally 2q numbers. So one digit is sufficient for n = 1, 2;
two digits for n = 1,2, ..., 4, q digits for n = 1, 2, ..., 2q, and in order to represent n numbers
we need to take the minimal q such that 2q k n. Since this inequality is equivalent to
q k log 2 n, we need Q digits to represent all these numbers. So we can ask the following
Q questions: "is the first binary digit v.n7", "is the second binary digit v.n'_", etc, up to "is
the q-th digit 0?".
The fact that we cannot use less than Q questions is also easy to prove. Indeed,
suppose we use q < Q questions. After we ask q binary questions, we get a sequence of
q O's and l's (q bits). If there is one bit, we have 2 possibilities: 0 or 1. We have q bits,
so we have 2.2.2.... 2(q times) = 2 q possible sequences. This sequence is the only thing
that we use to distinguish outcomes, so if we need to distinguish between n outcomes, we
need at least n sequences. So the number of sequences 2 q must be greater than or equal
to n: 2q k n. Since logarithm is a monotonic function, this inequality is equivalent to
q >_ log 2 n. But Q is by definition the smallest integer, that is greater than or equal to
this logarithm, and q is smaller, than Q. Therefore q cannot be k log 2 n, and hence q < Q
questions are not sufficient.
Situations that are covered by Shannon's formula. The above formula works fine
for the case when we have a single event, and we need to find what its outcome is. But in
many real- life cases same types of events happen again and again: for example, we can toss
the coin again and again, and we must predict weather every day, etc. In such cases there
is a potentially infinite sequence of repeating independent events. By the moment when
we are asking about the outcome of the current event, we normally already know what
outcomes happened before, which of them were more frequent, which were more seldom.
In some cases these frequencies change essentially in course of time: for example, in
case of the global warming the frequencies of cold weather days will become smaller and
smaller. But in many cases we can safely assume that these frequencies are more or less
the same. This means that the outcomes, that were more frequent in the past, will still be
more frequent, and vice versa.
Of course, the frequencies with which some outcome occurs in two long sequences
of N events, are not precisely equal. But it is usually assumed, that the larger N is, the
smaller is the difference between them. In other words, when N tends to oc, the frequencies
conyergeto a number that is called a limit frequency, or a probability Pi of an outcome i.
We can also express the same supposition by saying that the frequencies are estimates for
these probabilities: the bigger sample we take, the better are these estimates.
These frequencies are the additional information, that Shannon (1948) used to dimin-
ish the number of necessary questions.
Why probabilities help to diminish the number of questions: explanation in
commonsense terms. If we have just one event, then probabilities or no probabilities,
we still have to ask all Q = Flog2 n] questions. However, if we have N similar events,
and we are interested in knowing the outcomes of all of them, we do not have to ask Q
questions all N times: we can sometimes get out with less than QN questions and still
know all the outcomes.
Let's give a simple example why it is possible. Suppose we have 2 outcomes (n = 2),
and their probabilities are Pl = 0.99 and p2 - 0.01. If there is just one event, we have to
ask Q -- 1 question. Let's now consider the case of 10 events. If we knew no probabilities,
there would be 2 l° - 1024 possible combinations of outcomes, and so we need to ask at
least 10 - log 2 1024 questions in order to find all the outcomes.
But we do know the probabilities. And due to the fact, that the probability of the
second event is very small, it is hardly unprobable, that there will be 2 or more cases out
of 10 with the second outcome. If we neglect these unprobable cases, we conclude that
there are not 1004, but only 11 possible combinations: second outcome in first event, first
in all the other; second outcome in the second event, first in all the other, ... (10 such
combinations), and the eleventh which corresponds to first outcome in all the events. To
find a combination out of 11 possible we need only [log 2 11] = 4 questions. On average
we have 4/10 questions per event.
So, if we neglect low probability combinations of outcomes, then we can drastically
reduce the average number of questions. What if we do not neglect them? Let us show
that the average number of binary questions can still be kept small. Indeed, in the above
example, we can consider 12 mutually exclusive classes: 11 defined as above (classes that
consist of a single sequence of outcomes), and a 12th class that contains all rare outcome
sequences (in this example, outcome sequences with 2 or more second outcomes). We still
need 4 questions to figure out to which of these 12 mutually exclusive classes the sequence
of 10 actual outcomes belongs. If it belongs to one of the first 11 classes (that consist of
one sequence each), then we know the outcomes of all 10 events. In case we are in the 12th
class,we still have to ask 10 additional questions to find out the actual outcomes of all 10
events. In this casewe need 10additional questions,but this caseis very rare (probability
< 0.01). Therefore, it adds _< 0.01 • 10 = 0.1 to the average number of questions. So, we
can handle rare cases with a small effect on the average number of questions.
The above-given example may look purely mathematical, but it has lots of real-world
applications. As an example, Iet us take technical diagnosis: a system doesn't work, and
we must find out which of n components failed. Here we have two outcomes: good and
failed. In case the reliability of these components is sufficiently high, so that p2 << 1, we
can neglect the possibility of multiple failures, and thus simplify the problem.
Some statistics. When talking about Shannon's theory one cannot avoid using statistics.
However, we'll not copy (Shannon, 1948)" instead we reformulate so that it would be easy
to obtain a Dempster-Shafer modification.
Suppose that we know the probabilities pi, and that we are interested in the outcome
of N events, where N is given. Let's fix i and estimate the number of events Ni, in which
the outcome is i.
This number Ni is obtained by adding all the events, in which the outcome was i,
so Ni = nl + n2 + ... + nN, where nk equals to 1 if in k-th event the outcome is i and 0
otherwise. The average E(nk) of nk equals to Pi • 1 + (1 - Pi) ' 0 = Pi. The mean square
deviation a[nk] is determined by the formula ae[nt,] = pi(1-E(nk)) 2 +(1-pi)(O-E(nk))2.
If we substitute here E(nk) = Pi, we get _r2[nk] = p/(1 -- Pi). The outcomes of all these
events are considered independent, therefore nk are independent random variables. Hence
the average value of Ni equals to the sum of the averages of nk: E[Ni] = E[nt] + E[n2] +
... + E[nx] = Npi. The mean square deviation a[Ni] satisfies a corresponding equation
_2 [./Vii "" O'2[nl] + 0"217221 + ... -- Npi(l - Pi), so if[Nil "- X/Ipi(i - pi)Y.
For big N the sum of equally distributed independent random variables tends to
a Gaussian distribution (the well-known central limit theorem), therefore for big N we
can assume that Ni is a random variable with a Gaussian distribution. Theoretically a
random Gaussian variable with the average a and a standard deviation a can take any
value. However, in practice, if, e.g., one buys a measuring instrument with guaranteed
0.1V standard deviation, and it gives an error 1V, it means that something is wrong with
this instrument. Therefore it is assumed that only some values are practically possible.
Usually a "k-sigma" rule is accepted that the real value can only take values from a - k_r
to a + k_r, where k is 2, 3 or 4. So in our case we can conclude that Ni lies between
Npi - kv/_(1 -pi)N and Npi + kx/pi(1 -pi)N. Now we are ready for the formulation
of Shannon's result.
Comment. In this quality control example the choice of k matters, but, as we'll see, in our
case the results do not depend on k at all.
Formulation of Shannon's results.
Definitions. Suppose that a real number k > 0 and a positive integer n are given, n
is called the number of outcomes. By a probabilistic knowledge we mean a set {pi} of n
real numbers, Pi >_ O, _, Pi = 1. pi is called a probability of i-th event.
Suppose that an integer N is given; it is called the number of events. By a result of
N events we mean a sequence rk, 1 _< k _< N of integers from 1 to n. rk is called the result
of k-th event. The number of events, that resulted in i-th outcome, will be denoted by Ni.
We say that the result of N events is consistent with the probabilistic knowledge {pi } if for
every i the following inequality is true: N pi-k _/pi(1 - pi)N <_ Ni <_ N pi + k _/pi(1 - pi)N.
Let's denote the number of all consistent results by Ncon_(N). The number
[log2( Nco,s( N) )_ will be called the number of questions, necessary to determine the results
of N events and denoted by Q(N). The fraction Q(N)/N will be called the average number
of questions. The limit of the average number of questions will be called the complexity
of knowledge acquisition.
THEOREM (Shannon). When the number of events N tends to ini]nity, the average
number of questions tends to _ -pi log_(pi).
Comments. 1. This sum is known as an entropy of a probabilistic distribution {pi} and
denoted by S or S({pi}). So Shannon's theorem says that if we know the probabilities
of all the outcomes, then the average number of questions that we have to ask in order
to get a complete knowledge equals to the entropy of this probabilistic distribution. In
other words: in case we know all the probabilities, the complexity of knowledge acquisition
equals to the entropy of this probabilistic distribution.
2. As promised, the result does not depend on k.
3. Since we modified Shannon's definitions, we cannot use the original proof. Our
proof is given in Section 6.
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3. DEMpSTER-SHAFER CASE
Dempster-Shafer (DS) formalism in brief (Smets et al, 1988). The basic element
of knowledge in this formalism is as follows: an expert gives several hypotheses El,..., Ep
about the real world (these hypotheses are not necessarily incompatible), and describes
his degrees of belief re(E1), re(E2), ..., m(Ep) in each of these hypotheses. These values are
called masses, and their sum is supposed to be equal to 1. There are also combination rules
that allow us to combine the knowledge of several experts; as a result we again get a set
of hypotheses (that combine the hypotheses of several experts), and their masses (degrees
of belief).
So in general the knowledge consists of a finite set of statements El, E2, ..., Ep about
the real world, and a set of real numbers m(Ei) such that _ m(Ei) = 1.
What "complete knowledge" means in DS. This knowledge is incomplete: first of all,
because we do not know which of the hypotheses Ei is true. But even if we manage to figure
that out, the uncertainty can still remain, because this hypothesis Ei does not necessarily
determine uniquely the state of our system. Therefore, if we want to estimate how far we
are from the complete knowledge, we must know what is meant by a complete knowledge.
In other words, we need to know the set W of possible states of the analyzed system
(these states are sometimes called possible worIds). Of course, there are infinitely many
states of any real objects, but usually we are interested only in finitely many properties
P1, P2, ..., Pro. It means that if for some pair of states Sl, s2 each of these properties is true
in sl if and only if it is true in s2, then we consider them as one state. In this sense a
state is uniquely determined by the m- dimensional Boolean vector, that consists of truth
values Pi(s). So the set of all possible worlds consists of all such vectors, for which a state
s with these properties is possible at all.
Where do we take the masses from? In order to use this formalism to describe actual
knowledge we must somehow assign the masses to the experts' beliefs. The fact that the
sum of these masses equals to 1 prompts the interpretation of masses as probabilities. And,
indeed, the very formalism stemmed from probabilities, therefore probabilistic way is one
of the possible ways to estimate masses.
For example, we can ask several experts what statement better describes their knowl-
edge, take all these statements for Ei and for m(Ei) take the fraction N(Ei)/N, where N
is the total number of experts, and N(Ei) is the number of experts whose knowledge is
described by the statement Ei. Or, alternatively, we can ask one expert, and by analyzing
the similar situations he can say that in the part m(Ei) of all these cases a hypothesis Ei
was true. It is also possible that the expert does not know so many cases, but he tries to
make a guess, based on his experience of likewise cases.
There exist other methods to determine masses, that are not of probabilistic origin,
but we'll consider only probabilistic ones for 3 reasons (more detailed explanations of the
pro-probabilistic viewpoint can be found in Pearl, 1989, Dubois and Prade, 1989, Halpern
and Fagin, 1990, Shafer and Pearl, 1990):
We'll consider only probabilistic methods to determine masses; why?
1) There are arguments (starting from Savage, 1954, 1962) that if an expert assigns
the degrees of belief to several mutually exclusive events, and assigns them in a rational
manner, then they automatically satisfy all the properties of probabilities (they are called
subjective probabiIities). In Dempster-Shafer case, the mass re(E) represent an expert's
degree of belief in the statement "the set of all possible alternatives coincides with E".
Such statements for different E are mutually exclusive, and therefore, we can apply the
above-mentioned arguments.
2) Several non-probabilistic methods of assigning degrees of belief that we successfully
applied, turned out to have probabilistic origin; for example, for the rules of MYCIN, the
famous successful expert system (Shortliffe, 1976, Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984), it was
proved in (Heckerman, 1986).
3) Finally, in case we interpret masses as probabilities, we know precisely what we
mean by saying that we believe in Ei with the degree of belief re(E,): namely, as we'll show
right now, this knowledge can be easily reformulated in terms of the future behavior of the
system. Therefore we can understand in precise terms, what is meant by this knowledge,
and what knowledge do we need in addition so that we would be able to narrow our
predictions to one actual outcome and thus get a complete knowledge. In case we do
not use a probabilistic interpretation, what restrictions this knowledge imposes on future
outcomes is difficult to figure out.
What does a DS knowledge mean? In case we accept a probabilistic interpretation,
then the knowledge that the hypothesis Ei is true with mass m(Ei), can be interpreted as
follows: if we have N similar events, then among these N cases there are approximately
Nrn(Et) in which the outcomes satisfy the statement El; among the remaining ones there
are approximately Nrn(E2) cases in which E2 is true, etc.
Warning. This does not mean that El is true only in Nm(E1) cases. According
to the original interpretation of Dempster and Sharer, the relation between masses and
probabilities is more complicated. In this interpretation, when our knowledge is given in
a DS form, it means that we do not know all the probabilities p. Instead, we know a
class 7v of probability distributions, that contains the actual distribution p. For each event
E, different distributions p from this class lead to different values of p(E). These values
form an interval [p-, p+]. The smallest possible value (it is also called a lower probability)
is equal to our belief bel(E) in E, and the biggest possible value p+ coincides with the
plausibility pl(E) of the event E.
To illustrate this point, let us give an example when masses are different from proba-
bilities.
Example. Suppose that the whole knowledge of an expert is that to some extent he
believes in some statement E. If we denote the corresponding degree of belief by m, we can
express this knowledge in DS terms as follows: he believes in E1 = E with degree of belief
re(E1) --- m, and with the remaining degree of belief rn(E2) = 1 - m he knows nothing,
i.e., E_ is a statement that is always true. In our terms this knowledge means that out of
N events there are _ Nm, in which E is true, and _ N(1 - rn), in which E_ is true. But
E2 is always true, so the only conclusion is that in at least ,_ Nm events E is true. It is
possible that E is always true (if it is also true for the remaining N(1 - m) events), and
it is also possible that E is true only in Nm cases (if E is false for the outcomes of the
remaining events).
We are almost ready to formalize this idea; the only problem is how to formalize
"approximately". But since we interpret masses as probabilities, we can apply the same
statistical estimates as in the previous section. So we arrive at the following definitions.
Definitions and the main result.
Denotations. For any finite set X, we'll denote by IX[ the number of its elements.
Definitions. Suppose that a real number k > 0 is given. Suppose also that a finite
set W is given. Its elements will be called outcomes, or possible worlds.
Comment. In the following text we'll suppose that the possible worlds are ordered, so
that instead of talking about a world we can talk about its number i - 1, .., n -- IWI. In
these terms W is equal to the set {1, 2, ..., n}.
By a Dempster-Shafer knowledge or DS knowledge for short we mean a finite set of
pairs < Ei, mi >, 1 _< i _< p, where Ei are subsets of W (called statements) and mi are
real numbers (called masses or degrees o£ belie D such that mi > 0 and _ mi = 1.
If an outcome r belongs to the set Ei, we'll say that r satisfles Ei. Suppose that an
integer N is given; it is called the number of events. By a result of N events we mean a
sequence rk, 1 _< k <_ N of integers from 1 to n. rk is called the outcome of k-th event.
We say that the result of N events is consistent with the DS knowledge < Ei,rn i >, if the
set {1, 2, ..., N} can be divided into p subsets H1,H2, ...,Hp with no common elements in
such a way that:
1)
2)
[Hi[
if k belongs to Hi, then the outcome rk of k-th event satisfies Ei;
the number [Hi[ of elements in Hi satisfies the inequality Nmi-k v/rni(1 - mi)N <_
Nmi + kv/rni(1 - mdN.
Let's denote the number of all results, that are consistent with a given DS-knowledge,
by Nco,,8(N). The number [log2(Nco,s(N))] will be called the number of questions, nec-
essary to determine the resuits of N events and denoted by Q(N). The fraction Q(N)/N
will be called the average number oar questions. The limit of average number of questions,
when N --* c_, will be called the complexity ofknoMedge acquisition.
To formulate our estimate we need some additional definitions.
Definitions. By a probabilistic distribution we mean an array of n non-negative
numbers Pl, ...,P,, such that _pj "- 1. We say that a probabilistic distribution is consistent
with the DS knowledge < Ei,rni >, i = 1,...,p, if and only if there exist non-negative
numbers zij such that _i zij = pj, Y_i ziy = mi and zij -- 0 if j does not belong to El.
Comments. 1. Informally, we want to divide the whole fraction mi of events, about
which the expert predicted that Ei is true, into the groups with fractions zij for all j E Ei,
so that the outcomes in a group zij is j.
2. This definition is not explicitly constructive, but if we fix a probabilistic distri-
bution and a DS knowledge, the question whether they are consistent or not is a linear
programming problem, so we can use the known algorithms to solve it (simplex method
or the algorithm of Karmarkar (1984)).
By an entropy of a DS knowledge we mean a maximum entropy of all probabilistic
distributions that are consistent with it.
In other words, this entropy is a solution to a following mathematical problem:
--_-_pjlog2p j ---* max under the conditions that _"_izij = pj, _-_jzij = rni, zij ___ 0
and zij = 0 for j not in Ei, where i runs from 1 to p, and j from 1 to n.
If we substitute pj -" _i zij, we can reformulate it without using p j: Entropy is a
solution of the following mathematical optimization problem:
--Z(Ezij)log2(Zzij)--*max,
i i
under the conditions that __,j zij = mi, zij >_ 0 and zij = 0 for j not in Ei.
Comments. 1. Entropy is a smooth convex function, all the restrictions are linear in zij,
so in order to compute the entropy of a given DS knowledge we must maximize a smooth
convex function on a convex domain. In numerical mathematics there exist sufficiently
efficient methods for doing that.
2. For the degenerate case, when a DS knowledge is a probabilistic one, i.e., when
n -- p and Ei = {i}, there is precisely one probabilistic distribution that is consistent with
this DS knowledge: this very pj, and therefore the entropy of a DS knowledge in this case
coincides with Shannon's entropy.
MAIN THEOREM. The complexity of knowledge acquisition for a DS knowledge
< Ei, rni > is equal to the entropy o£ this knowledge.
Comments. 1. Our definition of entropy is thus a natural generalization of Shannon's
entropy to a DS case. This not mean, of course, that this is the generalization. The
notion of entropy is used not only to compute the average number of questions, but in
several other applications: in communication theory, in pattern recognition, etc. Several
different generalizations of entropy to DS formalism have been proposed and turned out to
be efficient in these other problems (see, e.g., Yager, 1983, Pal and Datta Majumer, 1986,
Dubois and Prade, 1987, Nguyen, 1987, Klir and Folger, 1988, Dubois and Prade, 1989,
Pal, 1991, Kosko, 1992).
2. That the complexity of knowledge acquisition must be greater or equal that the
entropy of a DS knowledge is rather easy to prove. Indeed, if a probabilistic distribution
pj is consistent with a DS knowledge, and a result of N events is consistent with this
distribution, then it is consistent with a DS-knowledge as well. Therefore there axe at
least as many results consistent with DS knowledge as there are results consistent with
pj. Therefore the average number of questions in a DS case must be not smaller than the
averagenumber of questions (entropy) for everyprobabilistic distribution that is consistent
with this knowledge. So it must be greater than or equal to the maximum of all such
probabilistic entropies; and we have called this maximum an entropy of a DS knowledge.
The fact that it is precisely equal, and not greater, is more difl:icult to prove, and demands
combinatorics (see Section 6).
4. THE ABOVE COMPLEXITY CHARACTERISTIC IS NOT SUFFI-
CIENT_ BUT WE NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT THAT
Example. The above characteristic describes the average number of questions that we
need to ask in order to attain the complete knowledge. However, we'll now show that it
is sometimes possible that we add the new information, and this characteristic remains
the same. The simplest of such situations is as follows: suppose that there are only two
possible outcomes. If we know nothing about them, this can be expressed in DS terms
as follows: there is only one statement (p = 1), and this statement E1 is identically true
(i.e., E1 = W = {1, 2}). In this case the above mathematical optimization problem is easy
to solve, and yields 1. This result is intuitively very reasonable: if we know nothing, and
there axe two alternatives, we have to ask one binary question in order to figure out, which
of the outcomes actually occurred.
Suppose now that we analyzed the previous cases and came to a conclusion that on
average in half of these cases the first outcome occurred, in half of them the second one.
In other words, we add the new information that the probability of both outcomes is equal
to 1/2. This is really a new information, because it diminishes the number of possibilities:
For example, if we observed 100 events, in case we knew nothing it was quite possible that
in all the cases we would observe the first outcome. In case we know that the probability is
1/2, then the possible number N1 of cases, in which the first outcome occurs, is restricted
by the inequalities 1/2. 100- k_/1/2(1 - 1/2)100 < N1 _< 1/2. 100+ kv/1/2(1 - 1/2)100,
or 50-5k < N1 _< 50+5k. Even for k = 4 the value N1 = I00 does not satisfy this
inequality and is therefore negligibly rare (therefore for k < 4 it also cannot be equal to
100).
In other words, we added a new information. But if we compute the uncertainty
(entropy) of the resulting probabilistic distribution, we get - 1/2 Iog2 (1/2)- 1/2 log2(1/2) =
-1 • log2(1/2 ) = 1, i.e., again 1! We added the new information, but the uncertainty did
not diminish. We still have to ask in average one question in order to get a complete
knowledge.
Isn't it a paradox? No, becausewe were estimating the averageamount of questions
lira Q(N)/N. We have two cases, in which the necessary number of questions QI(N) in the
first case is evidently bigger than in the second one (QI(N) > Q2(N)), but this difference
disappears in the limit. In order to show that it is really so, let us compute Q(N) in both
cases.
If we know nothing, then all sequences of 1 and 2 are possible as the results, i.e., in
this case Ncons is equal to 2 N. Therefore log 2 Neons = N, and Q1 (Y) = [log 2 Neons7 = N.
In the second case computations are more complicated (so we moved them to Section
6), and the result for big N is Q2(N) = N- cl where c is a constant depending on k. Since
c/N ---. O, in the limit this difference disappears and so it looks like in these two cases the
uncertainty is the same.
Do we need to worry about that? To answer this question let's give a numeric
estimate of the difference between Q_(N) and Q2(N); this difference occurs only when
the inequality N/2 - kN/2 < N1 <_ N/2 + kN/2 really restricts the possible values of N.
If k = 2, then for N < 4 all possible values of N1 from 0 to N satisfy it, so Q1 = Q2-
Therefore the difference starts only with N = 5. The bigger k, the bigger is the N, from
which the difference appears. The value of this difference c = Q1 (Y)- Q2(N) depends on
k (see the proof in Section 6). The smaller the k, the bigger is c. The smallest value of k
that is used in statistics is k = 2. For k = 2, we have c ,_ 0.1. In comparison with 5 it is
2%. For bigger N or bigger k it is even smaller.
So this difference makes practical sense, if we can somehow estimate Q(N) with a
similar (or better) precision. But Q(N) is computed from the initial degrees of belief
(masses) mi. There is already a tiny difference between, say, 70% and 80% degree of
belief, and hardly anyone can claim that in some cases he is 72% sure, and in some other
cases 73%, and that he feels the difference. There are certainly not so many subjective
degrees of belief. In view of that the degrees of belief are defined initially with at best
5 - 10% precision. Therefore the values of Q(N) are known with that precision only, and
in comparison to that adding _< 2% of c is, so to say, under the noise level.
So the answer to the question in the title is: no, we don't need to worry.
5. PROBABILISTIC KNOWLEDGE
Let's analyze the case of a probabilistic knowledge as described in (Nilsson, 1986),
when we know the probabilities of several statements. In this case, we can repeat the
above-given definitions almost verbatim.
Definitions. Suppose that a real number k > 0 is given. Suppose also that a finite
set W --- {1,2, ...,n} is given. Its elements will be called outcomes, or possible worlds. By
a probabilistic knowledge we mean a finite set of pairs < Ei,p(Ei) >, 1 <_ i <_ p, where Ei
are subsets of W and 0 < p(Ei) _< 1. Subsets Ei are called statements, and the number
p(Ei) is called a probability of i-th statement.
If an outcome r belongs to the set Ei, we'll say that r satislqes El.
Suppose that an integer N is given; it is called the number of events. By a result of N
events we mean a sequence rk, 1 <_ k _ N of integers from 1 to n. rk is called the outcome of
k-th event. We say that the result of N events is consistent with the probabilistic knowledge
< Ei,p(Ei) >, if for all i from 1 to p the number Ni of all rk that belong to Ei satisfies
the inequality Np(Ei) - k x/p(Ei)(1 - p(Ei))g <_ Ni <_ Np(Ei) + k x/p(Ei)(1 - p(Ei))N.
Let's denote the number of all results, that are consistent with a given probabilistic
knowledge, by Nco,,s(N). The number [log2(Ncons(Y))] will be called the number of
questions, necessary to determine the results of N events and denoted by Q(N). The
fraction Q(N)/N will be called the average number of questions. The limit of average
number of questions, when N _ oe, will be called the complexity ofknowIedge acquisition.
By a probabilistic distribution we mean an array of n non- negative numbers Pl, ..., P,_
such that __,pj = 1. We say that a probabilistic distribution is consistent with a proba-
bilistic knowledge < Ei,p(Ei) >, i = 1,...,p, if and only if for every i: EjEEi -" Pi. By
an entropy of a probabilistic knowledge we mean a maximum entropy of all probabilistic
distributions that are consistent with it, i.e., the solution to a following mathematical op-
timization problem: - _pj log 2 pj ---* max under the conditions _jEE, PJ - p(Ei), pj >_ 0
and E" j=lPJ = 1.
Comment. This is also a convex optimization problem.
THEOREM. The complexity of knowledge acquisition t'or a probabilistic knowledge is
equal to the entropy of this knowledge.
Comments. 1. Main Theorem and this result can be combined as follows: if our knowledge
is not sufficient to determine all the probabilities uniquely, so that several different proba-
bilistic distributions are compatible with it, then the uncertainty of this knowledge is equal
to the uncertainty of the distribution with the maximal entropy. It is worth mentioning
that the distribution with maximal entropy has many other good properties, and is there-
fore often used as a most "reasonable" one when processing incomplete data in science
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(for a survey seeJaynes, 1979, and referencestherein; seealso Koshelevaand Kreinovich
(1979) and Cheeseman(1985)).
2. Similar maximum entropy result can be proved for the casewhen part of the
knowledge is given in a DS form, and part in a probabilistic form. In this casewecan also
formulate, what we mean by saying that probabilities are consistent with a given knowl-
edge, and prove that the complexity of knowledgeacquisition is equal to the maximum
entropy of all probabilistic distributions, that are consistent with a given knowledge.
6. PROOFS
Proof of Shannon's Theorem. As we have mentioned in the main text, the Theorem
that we prove is not the original Shannon's,but its modification: Shannonwas interested
in data communication, and not in asking questions. So we must modify the proof. The
proof that weare using first appearedin (Kreinovich, 1989). Let's first fix some values Ni,
that are consistent with the given probabilistic distribution. Due to the inequalities that
express the consistency demand, the ratio f, = Ni/N tends to Pi as N _ oc. Let's count
the total number C of results, for which for every i the number of events with outcome i
is equal to this Ni. If we know C, we will be able to compute Nco,s by adding these C's.
Actually we are interested not in Nco,_, itself, but in Q(N) _ log 2 Neons, and moreover,
in lim(Q(N)/N). So we'll try to estimate not only C, but also log 2 C and lim ((log 2 C)/N).
To estimate C means to count the total number of sequences of length N, in which
there are N1 elements, equal to 1, N2 elements, equal to 2, etc. The total number C1
of ways to choose N1 elements out of N is well-known in combinatorics, and is equal to
(NN1 ) = N!/((N1)!(N- N1)!). When we choose these N1 elements, we have a problem in
choosing N2 out of the remaining N - N1 elements, where the outcome is 2; so for every
choice of l's we have C2 = (NN_vl) possibilities to choose 2's. Therefore in order to get
the total number of possibilities to choose l's and 2's, we must multiply C2 by C1. Adding
3's, 4,s, ..., n's, we get finally the following formula for C:
N! (N - N_)! N!
C = CI C2...C._I = =
NI[(N - N_)[ (N2!(N - N_ - N2)! "'" NI!N2[...N,!
To simplify computations let's use the well-known Stirling formula, according to which k!
is asymptotically equivalent to (k/e)k_. If we substitute these expressions into the
above formula for C, we conclude that
( N / e) N 2vf_-NC_
Since _ Ni = N, terms e x and ex_ annihilate each other.
To get further simplification, we substitute Ni = Nfi, and correspondingly N y_
as (Nfi) NI_ = NNY_fi NA. Terms N N is the numerator and NNANNI_...N Nf" =
N NII+NI2+'''+NI" = N N in the denominator cancel each other. Terms with v/N lead
to a term that depends on N as cN -(n-I) 2. Now we are ready to estimate log 2 C. Since
logarithm of the product is equal to the sum of logarithms, and log a b = b log a, we conclude
that log 2 C _ -N fl log 2 fl - N f2 log2 f2 - ... - Nf,_ log 2 f, - 1/2(n - 1) log 2 N - const.
When N ---+ oc, we have 1/N --+ 0, log 2 N/N ---+ 0 and fi -+ Pi, therefore log 2 C/N
-Pl log2 Pl - p2 log2 P2 - ... - P,_ log2 P,_, i.e., log 2 C/N tends to the entropy of the proba-
bilistic distribution.
Comment. We used the denotation A _ B for some expressions A and B meaning that the
difference between A and B is negligible in the limit N -+ c_ (i.e., the resulting difference
in (log 2 C)/N tends to 0).
Now, that we have found an asymptotic expression for C, let's compute Neons and
Q(N)/N. For a given probabilistic distribution {pi} and every i possible values of Ni
form an interval of length Li = 2kx/pi(1 - pi)v/-N. So there are no more than Zi possible
values of Ni. The maximum value for pi(1 - pi) is attained when pi = 1/2, therefore
pi(1 -pi) < 1/4, and hence eli < 2kv/'N/4 = kv/-N/2. For every i from t to n there are at
most (k/2)v/-N possible values of Ni, so the total number Nco of possible combinations of
N, is smaller than ((k/2)v/N) n.
The total number Nco,,s of consistent results is the sum of N_o different values of
C (that correspond to different combinations N1, N2, ..., Nn). Let's denote the biggest of
these C by Cm_x. Since N_on, is the sum of N_o terms, and each of them is not greater
than the biggest of them Cm_x, we conclude, that Ncon, <_ NcoCmax. On the other hand,
the sum Ncon, is bigger than each of its terms, i.e., Cmax <_ Ncons. Combining these two
inequalities, we conclude, that Cmax ___ l_7"cons _ NcoCmax. Since Nco <_ ((k/2)v@-) n, we
conclude that Cmax _ N¢ons <_ ((k/2)v/-N)nCm_x. Turning to logarithms, we find that
log2(Cm_× ) _< log2(N_on, ) _< log2(Cm_, ) + (n/2) log 2 N +const. Dividing by N, tending to
the limit N _ oc and using the fact that limN_oo(log 2 N)/N = 0 and the already proved
fact that log2(Cm_x)/N tends to the entropy S, we conclude that lim Q(N)/N = S. Q.E.D.
Proof of the Main Theorem. Let's denote by hi some integer numbers that satisfy
the inequalities Nmi - kx/rni(1 - mi)N < hi <_ Nmi + k_/mi(1 - rni)N from Section 3.
Let's denote the ratios hi/N by gi. Due to these inequalities, when N ---+0% gi -+ rni.
Unlike the previous Theorem, even if we know gi, i.e., know how many outcomes
belong to Ei for every i, we still cannot uniquely determine the frequencies fj of different
outcomes. If there exists a result of N events with given frequencies gi and fj, then we
can further subdivide each set Hi into subsets Zij that correspond to different outcomes
j _ Ei. In this case _j Zij = hi and _i Zij = Nfj; therefore the frequencies tij = Zij/N
satisfy the equalities _j tij = gi and _i tij = fj. Vice versa, if there exist values tij such
that these two equalities are satisfied, and Ntij is an integer for all i,j, then we can divide
W into sets of size hi, each of them into sets with Ntij elements and thus find a result with
given gi and fj. If such tij exist, we'll say that the frequencies gi and fj are consistent
(note an evident analogy between this concept and the definition of consistency between
a DS knowledge and a probabilistic distribution).
Let's now prove, that if the set of frequencies {fj } is consistent with the set {gi}, and
we have a result, in which there are N fl outcomes that are equal to 1, N f2 outcomes that
are equal to 2, etc., then this result is consistent with the original DS knowledge. Indeed,
we can subdivide the set of all the outcomes, that are equal to j, into subsets with Ntij
elements for all i such that j EEi. We'll say that the elements that are among these
Ntij ones are labeled by i. Totally there are )-'_j Ntij = N _'_j tij = Ngi = hi elements,
that are labelled by i, and for all of them Ei is true. Since hi was chosen so as to satisfy
the inequalities that are necessary for consistency, we conclude that this result is really
consistent with a DS knowledge.
The number C of results with given frequencies {fj } has already been computed in
the proof of Shannon's theorem: lira ((log 2 C)/N) = - _ fj log 2 fj.
The total number of the results Nco,s, that are consistent with a given DS knowledge,
is the sum of Nco different values of C, that correspond to different fj. For a given N
there are at most N + 1 different values of N1 = N fl (0,1,...,N), at most N + 1 different
values of N2, etc., totally at most (N + 1) n different sets of {fj }. So, like in the proof of
Shannon's theorem, we get an inequality Cmax _< Nco,s <_ (N + 1)"Cmax, from which we
conclude, that limQ(N)/N = lim(log2Cm_,x)/N.
When N --_ oo, the values gi tend to mi, and therefore these frequencies fj tend
to the probabilities p./, that are consistent with a DS knowledge. Therefore (log 2 C)/N
tends to the entropy of the limit probabilistic distribution, and (log 2 Cm_x)/N tends to the
maximum of such entropies. But this maximum is precisely the entropy of a DS knowledge
as we defined it. So lim(Q(N)/N) equals to the entropy of a DS knowledge. Q.E.D.
The estimates for a probabilistic case are proved likewise.
Proof of the statement from Section 4. We have to consider the case, when n = 2
(there are two possible outcomes). In this case the result of N events is a sequence of l's
and 2's. A result is consistent with our knowledge if and only if the number N1 of l's
satisfies the inequality N/2 - k_"K/2 < N1 < N/2 + kv'_N (actually we must demand that
the likewise inequality is true for N2 = N - N1, but one can easily see that this second
inequality is equivalent to the first one). Let's estimate the number Ncons of such results.
In order to get this estimate let's use the following trick. Suppose that we have N
independent equally distributed random variables rk, each of which attains two possible
values 1 and 2 with equal probability 1/2. Then the probability of each of 2 N possible
sequences of l's and 2's is the same: 2 -N. The probability P that a random sequence
satisfies the above inequalities is equal to the sum of the probabilities of all the sequences
that satisfy it, i.e., is equal to the sum of Neons terms, that are equal to 2 -y. So P =
Neons2 -y. Therefore, if we manage to estimate P, we'll be able to reconstruct Neons by
using a formula Neons = 2N p.
So let us estimate P. Let's recall the arguments that lead to the inequalities that we
are using. The total number N1 of l's in a sequence {rk} is equal to the sum of terms that
are equal to 1 if rk = 1 and to 0 if rk = 2. In other words, it is the sum of 2 - rk. So N1 is
the sum of several equally distributed variables, and therefore for big N its distribution is
close to Gaussian, with the average N/2 and the standard deviation a = v/-N/2. Therefore
for big N the probability that N1 satisfies the above inequalities is equal to the probability
that the value of a Gaussian random variable with the average a and standard deviation
a lies between a -/co" and a + ka. This probability P depends only on k and does not
depend on N at all. For example, for k = 2 P _ 0.95, and for bigger k P is bigger. Since
Ncons- P2 N, we conclude, that Q(N) ,._ log2(P2 N) = N- c, where c = -log 2 P. For
k = 2 we get c = -log 2 P ,_ 0.1, and for bigger k it is even smaller.
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